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In May 1945 Germany surrendered unconditionally. With this act the Second World War came to a 
close in Europe and consequently new tasks came into sight. Once the enemy was defeated it was 
necessary to reconstruct the war-shattered European economies, to stabilize the respective societies 
and to create an enduring global peace settlement. It was obvious that the terms and conditions of this 
political and economic peace settlement were to be decided by the Allies.  It was evident that Germany 
would not take part in the respective deliberations. Likewise was it clear that German ideas would not 
play a decisive role. Being defeated, occupied and destroyed Germany was - above all in the 
immediate post-war years - in the first place "an issue" only.1 This, however, changed quickly. While 
the creation of a world economic system proved to be complicated and thus protracted, the Western 
Zones of Germany or the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; from 1949 onwards) became in the 
framework of the emerging Cold War an "occupied Ally".2 In addition, it became clear that Germany 
was an important economic potential for the European economic reconstruction. Last not least, after 
World War II there was a strong notion that the mistakes of Versailles, the peace treaty after World 
War I which had been imposed on Germany and which had poisoned international relations, should not 
be repeated. All this meant that Germany's goodwill had to be secured and that both Germany and 
German ideas had to be considered. Thus, over the years the FRG became an ever more important and 
active, though not yet sovereign, player as regards the questions of a future economic and political 
peace settlement. 
    
In the following I will deal with German ideas and attitudes as regards a future peace settlement. 
Putting the stress on monetary and economic issues I will analyze German reactions to the proposals 
put forward in the course   
of time and I will investigate into the role the FRG and above all its monetary authority, the German 
Central Bank (Bank deutscher Länder (BdL) until 1957; Deutsche Bundesbank from 1957 onwards) 
played in bringing about a new monetary and economic order. Since, however, in the post-war period 
economics and politics were inseparably linked I will also comment on political issues. 
    The paper is structured as follows. First, I will specify the tasks ahead and discuss shortly the plans 
under consideration and the possible options. Second, I will comment briefly on the historiography of 
German foreign economic policy, thus putting the following into place. In the main part I will analyze 
the stance the German Central Bank took when facing the question of a monetary and economic peace 
settlement. However, I will not only deal with the attitudes of the German Central Bank and thus 
German financial circles. In addition I will include in the analysis how other circles reacted to the 
Bank's opinions. Thus I will be able to specify the role the Bank could play inside the German policy 
making process as well as elucidate the attitudes of other actors which are usually not considered 
extensively in this respect like for example German industrial circles as represented by the 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie.3 
  
   
The Tasks and the Options 
  
   
After the Second World War the major task was to remedy the legacy of the war, i.e. to reconstruct the 
war-shattered European economies, to stabilize the respective societies and to create an enduring peace 
settlement. However, it was not only the legacy of the Second World War that was on the agenda, 
moreover, also the legacies of the First World War, of the interwar years and of the world economic 
crisis had to be tackled. To recall: the First World War had led to the Treaty of Versailles and the severity of this treaty had not only poisoned the international relations but also it had - as his famous 
critic John Maynard Keynes had warned already in 1920 - hindered German economic recovery and 
thus had impaired _yet further ... the delicate complicated organisation, already shaken and broken by 
war, through which alone European peoples can employ themselves and live_.4 Although in the 
decade after World War I - as Charles Maier has pointed out -  bourgeois Europe was "recast" and 
finally "a discernible equilibrium among economic interests, classes, and nations" had emerged, this 
stability was superficial and proved to be short-lived only.5 The world economic crisis of the late 
1920s and early 1930s made the weaknesses of this settlement crystal-clear, and indeed by 1931 the 
economic difficulties resulted in a crash of the global monetary and economic system. In summer 1931 
Germany introduced foreign exchange controls and in September of the same year the United   
Kingdom let the exchange rate of the Pound Sterling float freely. In the following years quantitative 
restrictions were put into operation and competitive devaluations were decided. Be it for the sake of 
the monetary reserves, be it for the sake of some employment at home protectionist tendencies 
blossomed and economic bloc-building was pursued. This, however, equaled "international economic 
disintegration" and was connected with a steep decline in world trade.6  
    After the war or, more precisely, during the war it was seen as a major task to reconstruct some 
economic and monetary understanding. On the one hand this system should allow international trade 
and it should provide some safeguards against protectionist tendencies. On the other hand, however, 
this system should also protect the mostly scarce monetary reserves and it should not expose industry 
to a too hard international competition. Furthermore, such a system should allow for reconstruction and 
modernization while at the same time allowing an economic policy which would take care of the aim 
'full employment'. 
    
    In the course of time several plans which aimed at the establishment of an international economic 
order fulfilling these requirements  were put forward. I would like to comment on these and thus 
present the three most important options open to the FRG, namely firstly the Bretton Woods System, 
secondly the OEEC Cooperation and lastly what came to be called European Integration. 
    
The first attempts to remedy the legacy of the world economic crisis date back to the early 1940s and 
focused on the creation of a global monetary system. After lengthy, mainly Anglo-American 
discussions these endeavors led in 1944 to the Bretton Woods Conference. Here 44 countries agreed to 
establish a global monetary order based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates, convertibility of 
currencies, absence of exchange restrictions and an international supervisory authority, the later 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the Bretton Woods Accord was signed and ratified by 
the necessary number of countries, the difficulties to realize it became soon obvious. Even after the 
envisaged five-year-transition-period only a small number of states was willing to accept the 
obligations laid down in this agreement. Thus, the global multilateral and liberal monetary order as 
envisaged in the Bretton Woods Accord was irrelevant for the foreseeable future.7 In addition, it must 
be noted that the concomitant world trade agreement, the International Trade Organization (ITO), on 
which 53 countries agreed in 1947, soon run into difficulties. While the US Congress refused to ratify 
this accord, only the provisional General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was put into 
operation. Although 23 countries accepted with their adherence to the GATT the application of the 
multilateral most-favored-nation-clause for their tariff policy, once more this episode showed clearly 
how difficult it was to realize a global economic understanding.8 
 
Having realized the difficulties to erect a global economic system the US started to advocate regional 
economic cooperation within Europe from 1947 onwards. With George Marshall's speech in Harvard 
the US offered foreign economic aid on the condition that Europe would cooperate and that Germany 
would be firmly integrated within this framework of cooperation. This proposal - which came to be 
called European Recovery Program (ERP) or Marshall Plan - led to the establishment of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948. This intergovernmental 
framework which was made up of initially 18, later 16 Western European members had the task to 
distribute the foreign economic aid and to foster regional cooperation. As a result in autumn 1948 a 
first, and in autumn 1949 a second Intra-European payments agreement were signed. Furthermore, in 
autumn 1949 the OEEC members agreed on a liberalization program for European trade. As a first step 
they decided to abolish quantitative restrictions on 50 per cent of private intra-European trade. With the establishing of the European Payments Union (EPU) with which transferability of European 
currencies was assured and new means of payment were provided it was envisaged to rise this quota to 
75 per cent. 
    This regional cooperation had several flaws. Apart from the fact that it was slow in providing 
concrete results of cooperation, the OEEC trade liberalization program dealt with quantitative 
restrictions on private trade without affecting the sometimes considerable portion of state trade. 
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the OEEC paid no attention to tariff questions. Last not least it 
must be noted that escape clauses could be applied.9 
    
While the intergovernmental approach as realized in the OEEC fell short from the aspirations of some 
countries, in spring 1950 the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a European 
Community for Coal and Steel (ECSC). This proposal envisaged the pooling of the resources of the 
respective sectors and the administration of these   
resources by a new, supranational High Authority. The underlying purpose of the plan was to submit 
German heavy industry to international control. 
    After lengthy negotiations the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC was signed in 1951 by six 
Western European countries, namely France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.10 With this a new form of economic 'cooperation' - a supranational 
framework - came into being. In the following years several proposals which also aimed at some kind 
of supranationality were followed up. Already in autumn 1950 the French defense minister, René 
Pleven, proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) and in the next years this 
EDC and concomitant with it a European Political Community as well as a first proposal for a 
European customs union - the Beyen Plan - were under discussion. After the failure of the EDC in 
summer 1954, in spring 1955 a proposal which envisaged a common European Market was put 
forward. By 1957 this proposal had resulted in the Rome Treaties with which the six member states of 
the ECSC agreed upon a European Economic Community (EEC) and an European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom).11 
    
In the 1950s Germany had to take a standpoint as regards the three options outlined shortly above. In 
the context of the Cold War options which implied an understanding between East and West Europe 
were not open to the semi-sovereign FRG. However, it should be pointed out that nevertheless - from a 
German point of view - this could become an important and delicate issue, given that, traditionally, the 
German economy had strong links with Eastern Europe. 
  
   
Some comments on historiography 
  
   
In a recent survey on German contemporary historiography Anselm Doering-Manteuffel stressed that 
initially professional historians hardly paid any attention to the German post-War history and that thus 
the foundations of West-German post-war historiography have been build by political scientists.12 
This had the repercussion that - largely untouched by the then lively discussions on historical 
methodology - a certain methodological conservatism prevailed and exclusively political history and 
its actors were in the focus of interest - all the more so since such an orientation was favored by the 
availability of sources and fostered both by the publication of the memoirs of Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and the research policy of the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus.13 While this 
approach was without a doubt justified by both the importance of Adenauer and the significance of 
international policy for Germany in this period, this focus was also connected with certain distortions 
and shortcomings. 
    In the late 1980s and the 1990s - parallel with the growing distance, with the opening of archives 
and with an increased interest by the historical profession -  the situation changed. While the 
Adenauer-Forschung was continued and the focus on high politics or the bureaucratic decision-
making-processes was maintained14, new questions and interests came up so that research diversified. 
Now attention was paid also to the social development15; security policy became - mainly through the 
endeavors of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt and based on the there available sources - an 
important research field16; the economic performance and the policy of the Minster of Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard moved in the focus of interest, not least fostered by the endeavors of the 
Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung.17 While it should be stated that thus in the last years historical research has 
embarked on some interesting approaches, has tried to answer interesting questions and has provided 
important results, there are still some shortcomings. As far as for example the field of economic policy 
and economic policy making is concerned only slowly was attention paid to other actors besides the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. Studies on for example the German entrepreneur or the stance and role 
of pressure groups like German heavy industry were the exemption.18 
    The outlined state of research until the early 1990s has not been able to clarify all important 
questions. As for example regards the question why the FRG did embark on the road of European 
integration only answers which have not been satisfactory in all respects have been provided so far. 
Here it has been maintained that Adenauer and the primacy of (foreign) policy were decisive while 
economic rationales were left unconsidered. Such an interpretation has been possible since it was 
obvious to economic experts from the beginning that European Integration did not lay in the interest of 
German economic development. Furthermore, it was only too obvious that Erhard had opposed this 
integration fervently and that he had been defeated by Adenauer, Thus, it seemed logical to explain the 
German embarking on the road to integration with the primacy of foreign policy. This, however, is - as 
I will argue in the following  - only part of the story. Looking for example at the attitude of the German 
Central Bank took when facing the question of an international economic understanding will show that 
not only political choicesm but also economic considerations, can be adduced to explain why Germany 
supported, and maintained support for, first cooperation within the OEEC and then integration within 
the EEC. 
 
    
The German Central Bank, the question of convertibility and European Integration 
  
   
The task of the German Central Bank (Bank deutscher Länder (BdL) until 1957, Deutsche Bundesbank 
from 1957 onwards) is   
to manage the German currency, to regulate the German money and credit supply, provide liquidity 
and safeguard monetary stability. In addition, the Central Bank is the guardian of the German 
monetary reserves and in the 1950s it had important competencies in allocating foreign exchange. 
Furthermore,  according to the law the German Central Bank should act as an adviser to the German 
Government as far as economic and monetary issues are concerned. 
    Although the German Central Bank was independent from the Government right from the beginning, 
initially it was quite weak. Being a two-tier institution policy issues were discussed highly 
controversially and at times it was difficult to reach decisions, all the more since the German economic 
situation was quite delicate. However, during the Korean Crisis of 1950/51 which led to a foreign 
exchange crisis and above all in the aftermath of this crisis the Bank could considerably enhance its 
standing, streamline its internal decision making process and improve its control of the German 
banking system. Thus, it proved itself to be in the position to decide a policy contrary to the wishes of 
the German Government; it was able to contribute to the overcoming of the difficulties by following a 
stringent policy; it was capable to take the initiative, to suggest realistic policy options and to convince 
other circles to follow the line advocated by the Bank.19 Thus, when it came to discussing the 
international monetary and economic order from 1952 onwards the Bank had an important say. 
    Right from the beginning the Bank had favored regional cooperation. In spring 1950, when a 
European Payments Union (EPU) was under discussion, it had argued that such a soft currency bloc 
would suit the FRG and its economic development. It would encourage imports from Europe and thus 
conserve scarce dollars. More important, however, was that it would foster German exports to a 
European market which was still protected from American competition. Thus, this regional framework 
would allow a German "penetration of the continental system".20 On the other hand, the Bank rejected 
a German adherence to a global monetary system. Indeed, in Spring 1951 it even expressed strong 
reservations as regards a German membership in the IMF.21 Main reason for this was that the Bank 
disapproved a devaluation of the Deutschmark. Such a step would only - so it argued - raise the costs 
for the necessary imports from the Dollar area without assuring the closure of the so-called 'Dollar 
Gap'. According to the Bank the answer to the existing Dollar Gap should be the application of foreign exchange restrictions for Dollar imports on the one hand, and the endeavor to achieve - via a strict 
monetary policy and thus price stability - competitiveness and a   
surplus in Europe on the other.22 At a later stage this surplus should serve to offset the deficit towards 
the Dollar area which was considered to be something 'natural' - and thus unalterable - for Germany.23 
For the time being, however, the Bank considered an equilibrium with the Dollar Area out of reach. 
Thus, it aimed at fostering the commercial exchange with the OEEC-Europe. 
    When in 1952 first the German Minister of Economic Affairs, and later the United Kingdom put the 
issue of convertibility and international monetary order on the agenda, the BdL maintained its previous 
attitudes. Although the German balance of payments position had in the meantime improved 
consistently, the BdL staged as the main and fervent opponent to both the United Kingdom which 
wanted to introduce convertibility and dissolve the EPU and the German Minister of Economic Affairs 
Ludwig Erhard who aimed at the realization of a liberal market economy as far as foreign economic 
relations were concerned. The Bank argued that European monetary cooperation and trade within 
Europe were too important to be neglected. 
25 It pointed out that an opening of the European market should be secured and that EPU should be 
maintained. Insisting that the dismantling of quotas in intra-European trade should be continued it 
thought it possible to foster and to secure such a liberalization of the European market within the 
OEEC framework by a German good-creditor policy. 
    Although in the period from 1952 to 1955 the German membership in EPU was connected with 
rising costs like the foregoing gold payments for the European surpluses, the crediting of 50 per cent of 
the surpluses to EPU, the examination of German policy in the forum of OEEC and trade diversions 
the Bank remained a supporter of the OEEC cooperation. Rejecting the option of convertibility which 
was a synonym for a global monetary agreement and interested neither in trade with Eastern Europe 
nor in trade with other countries from the off-set area it was willing to grant credit to the EPU. With 
this it wanted to keep this payments system working.26 To be sure, in the European discussions the 
Bank favored at times a hardening of the European soft currency bloc and advocated thus a   
step-by-step approach towards a global monetary system. However, when it seemed that these requests 
could lead to a break-down of the EPU and above all to a British withdrawal from EPU the Bank 
proved to be willing to compromise. In its opinion everything should be done to prevent such a 
withdrawal since it would probably enhance other options like for example a closer cooperation 
between the six ECSC members. Such an option the Bank considered _completely unrealistic_ and 
even _dangerous_ to the German economic development.27 
    The position of the BdL found inside the FRG as well as inside the OEEC forum a lot of sympathy. 
All OEEC-Members welcomed the willingness of the Bank to grant additional credit to the EPU, even 
the creditor countries which in principle favored a hardening too.28 Inside the FRG the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor shared the BdL's opinion that European cooperation should be 
continued. Their main reasons for this stance were political: they did not want the issue of 
convertibility to disturb the negotiations for an EDC; neither did they want to pursue monetary 
cooperation in the framework of the Six.29 The Ministry for the Marshall Plan favored of course the 
maintenance of the EPU and argued too that intra-European trade should not be damaged.30 The 
Ministry for Agriculture was concerned with the protection of the agrarian sector while the Ministry of 
Finance argued that a dismantling of foreign exchange controls was still dangerous.31 In addition to 
this, industrial and trade circles favored the pursuit of the OEEC and EPU cooperation. Like the BdL 
they feared a relapse into bilateralism which would reduce their export possibilities. They too were 
interested in open and secure European markets and above all in the Bank's financing of these 
exports.32 Thus on the whole a formidable opposition to all plans which envisaged a dismantling of 
EPU was formed and this opposition carried to a great extent the trademark of the BdL, of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and of German industrial circles. 
    Although in 1954 and 1955 the EPU was hardened, convertibility was envisaged and a European 
Monetary Agreement as a European post-convertibility-system was agreed on, on the whole the FRG 
proved to be a fervent supporter of OEEC cooperation in this period. As we have seen, political 
reasons were without a doubt important for taking this stance.33 However, it also becomes clear that 
economic issues played a major role too in determining this stance. 
    
    
    In 1955 in a certain sense a new phase commenced. On the one hand the OEEC member countries had 
agreed in summer 1955 to harden the European soft currency bloc from initially 40 per cent gold and 
60 per cent credit to 75 per cent gold and 25 per cent credit so that a de-facto-convertible EPU-System 
was in operation. On the other hand the Benelux Countries had proposed in May 1955 to their ECSC 
partners the establishment of a Common Market. In addition, it should be noted that in that period the 
German economy experienced a boom which generated dilemmas resulting from the considerable 
German balance-of-pbayments surplus with other OEEC countries. While the pursuit of the external 
equilibrium required an expansionist credit policy, the internal situation demanded a restrictive stance 
as far as monetary policy was concerned. In addition to this in a system based on fixed exchange rates 
balance of payments surpluses generate liquidity at home and thus endanger monetary stability. Hence 
the cost of the German membership in EPU rose considerably in this period. 
 
In order to restrict economic activity the German Central Bank inaugurated in summer 1955 a new 
policy line. It raised both the bank rates and the reserve requirements. Furthermore, it tried to sterilize 
the liquidity resulting from the balance of payments surplus. This new policy line aggravated the 
already existing external disequilibrium. It led to the granting of additional German credit to the EPU 
and it was connected with some - at times harsh, at times modest - pressure on the FRG to pursue a 
good creditor policy.34 
    This situation made it attractive for the FRG to push for convertibility and to advocate a dissolution 
of the EPU. This, however, did not happen. While Adenauer was concerned with the EEC and Euratom 
negotiations, the German Central Bank - after all the institution which granted the additional credit and 
whose policy was scrutinized by the EPU - still favored the maintenance of EPU.35 
    The Bank's stance was based on the hope that within the OEEC framework it would be in the 
position to put some pressure on other OEEC members and thus induce these countries to follow a 
'sound' monetary policies. Indeed,   
while the Bank refused to take stringent measures which aimed at correcting the German surplus - like 
for example a revaluation of the Deutschmark - it offered a special credit to the EPU. On the condition 
that an assainissement would be pursued this credit should be passed on to France which experienced 
considerable balance of payments difficulties in this period.36 
    Another reason for taking this stance was that the Bank did not want the FRG to be put _on the same 
line as the USA_.37 It pointed out that this with great probability would mean that the European 
countries would discriminate against German products and this was understood as being detrimental to 
German industry and German economic development. In order to avoid this the Bank argued that a 
declaration of convertibility for the Deutschmark should take place only on the condition that all 
European countries were able and willing to take part in such a move. Without having secured the 
taking part of all other countries the Bank wanted to stick to the OEEC cooperation. Although at times 
Germany's OEEC partners feared that the FRG would leave the EPU38, such a move was at no time 
considered seriously and what was more, at no time the Bank and other quarters took an initiative 
which envisaged a declaration of convertibility. Only when France agreed in autumn 1958 to devalue 
the French Franc, to resume liberalization and to take part in a move towards convertibility, this global 
option was pursued.39 
    As before the Bank's attitude as regards the EPU was largely shared by other German quarters. 
Adenauer and the Foreign Ministry were not interested in the issue of convertibility and what was 
more in January 1956 Adenauer established the 'guide-line' that no unfriendly act (such as a move 
towards convertibility) towards the future EEC-partners, mainly France, would be committed.40 
Industry supported the EPU because it provided a stable framework for intra-European trade. In this 
framework the supply from the OEEC area was possible and an export market, protected from other 
competitors and financed by the Central Bank, was secured. In addition to this, import restrictions and 
foreign exchange controls were no longer a burden for industry and a large freedom of action did 
already exist. Last but not least, the Minister for Economic Affairs stopped pushing for convertibility. 
Beside appreciating a stable framework for intra-European trade himself and being   
under pressure from the Chancellor and industry, his attitude shifted for other reasons: the integration 
in form of a European Economic Community was definitively disliked by him and he opposed this 
whenever possible.41 In order "to keep down less promising forms of integration" and in order to 
strengthen the OEEC framework where up to November 1958 the establishment of a wider Free Trade 
Area was discussed, he now wanted the OEEC to work smoothly and thus he refrained from discussions about hardening the EPU and declaring convertibility.42 Only when the United Kingdom 
took an initiative for convertibility and only when the Free Trade Area negotiations failed in autumn 
1958 did he return to his previously expressed dislike of the OEEC approach. 
    
An analysis of the stance the German Central Bank and the FRG took when the question of an 
international monetary order was discussed shows clearly that there were strong economic interests 
which spoke for the pursuit of an regional approach within the OEEC framework. This is also quite 
logical: after all in 1956 71,2 per cent of the German exports went to the EPU area43; furthermore, the 
German cumulative position in EPU amounted to $ 4.581 Billion when the EPU was liquidated on 
27.12.1958.44 However, as far as the embarking on the EEC integration is concerned the story is 
obviously different: only little more than 25 per cent of German exports went to the five EEC 
countries45; furthermore, a customs union which was connected with the introduction of a Common 
External Tariff could increase the German tariff protection and this was bound to make imports more 
expensive; apart from the fact that this would increase the German price level and could make German 
exports less competitive this would lead to an aggravation of the German surplus with the other 
European countries. These considerations would lead one to predict that the German Central Bank as 
well as industrial, trade and financial circles would oppose the erection of a Customs Union of the Six 
since this was obviously against the German economic interests. 
    
When in spring 1955 the idea of European economic integration was relaunched and when starting in 
summer 1955   
first discussions were held the German Central Bank showed neither a big interest nor principle 
reservation or even opposition.46 Only in the course of spring and summer 1956 did the Central Bank 
Council discuss this project more extensively, and only in October 1956 did Otmar Emminger, a high 
official of the Bank responsible for the international monetary cooperation, point out that now, _in 
order to be on the safe side_, one should take these discussions seriously.47 At this point, however, the 
Bank had to state that its room of maneuver was quite narrow. It could not oppose the EEC radically 
and principally, that would have been - as the Bank's officials saw it -  _political quixotism_.48 
    The archival material reveals that several reasons were responsible for taking this cautious, 
unconcerned, passive attitude. Inside the Bank it was always pointed out that the ongoing discussions 
were non-binding and that the French opposition to these proposals will make their realization highly 
unlikely.49 Furthermore, it was always stated that the EEC was in the first place based on political 
considerations and that thus the Bank should not intervene.50 Last not least, only in the course of time 
it became discernible that the emerging Common Market was too protectionist and too dirigist for the 
taste of the German Central Bank.51 
    Strange as these arguments sound they hint at important peculiarities of the EEC negotiations. After 
all, the discussions were for a long period non-committal, the French opposition made a realization 
unlikely until autumn 1956 when a breakthrough was reached, political considerations were important 
and decisive aspects of the EEC were only hammered out late in 1956.52 Thus, on the one hand there 
is only little room to dispute the sincerity of these arguments. On the other hand, however, these 
arguments are not convincing. However important the above arguments were they cannot explain why 
the Bank stepped back from such an important issue and why neither the Bank nor other German 
circles ever tried to strengthen the already existing formidable opposition to the EEC project.53 
    Indeed a careful reading of the documents shows that other arguments were important too. First of 
all, notwithstanding the fact that the Bank saw some negative aspects of the Treaty it discerned 
positive aspects too, and these aspects - so they argued - needed to be developed.54 Mainly they were 
still interested in the dismantling of trade restrictions and above all in the dismantling of the high 
French and Italian tariffs. On the other hand they were never worried about the effects of   
lowering the tariffs inside the EEC. They understood German industry as being able to compete with 
the Five also without relying on tariff protection. In addition the Bank war never too much concerned 
with the fact that German imports needed to be raised. Indeed, still in summer 1956 Hoose from the 
Central Bank Council stated that it was not clear to him why German imports should be fostered at all 
costs.55 The second important reason for not opposing the Common Market was that the Bank - 
together with other German quarters - had succeeded in the negotiations to oblige every member of the 
EEC to follow a policy in conformity with the balance of payments considerations. In this way a kind 
of 'functional integration' which relied on the concept of convertibility was assured instead of the 'institutional integration' which relied on new supervisory institutions for monetary policy.56 The last 
and most important reason for not opposing the EEC was that the Bank had been interested from the 
very beginning in some kind of European framework. During the negotiations on the structure of the 
monetary system that would exist after the return to convertibility had stated that after the liquidation 
of the EPU some forum for international cooperation would be _useful, if not indispensable._57 While 
in 1953/54 the erection of a forum made up of six members endangered the existing EPU framework 
and thus conflicted with the interests of the Bank, in 1955/56 this was not the case any more since the 
EPU was bound to be liquidated sooner or later. For this reason the fervent pleas against an ever 
stronger cooperation between the Six which were usual in 1953/54 were not made any more in 1956. 
 
    
Conclusions 
 
    
On the 1.1.1959 the EPU was liquidated, convertibility was declared and thus a global international 
monetary system was finally established. In addition on the 1.1.1959 the first tariff cut of the EEC 
members took place and thus the EEC showed itself to be a working institution. With these acts 13 
years after the end of World War II a new economic and political peace settlement was inaugurated. 
    It has always been pointed out that the main thrust of European integration has been political. In 
recent years historical research has questioned this. Scholars such as Alan S. Milward have pointed out 
that _the true origins of the European Community are economic and social._58 However, as far as 
Germany was concerned even Milward has maintained that political reasons were at the forefront.59 I 
have presented recent research on actors whose attitudes and policies had been neglected in studying 
the question why the FRG choose to back regional cooperation under the OEEC and then switched to 
supporting European economic integration. This research indicates that perceived economic interests 
remained an important determinant of West German policy. Economic considerations were made and 
led first to fostering the EPU and OEEC cooperation and then to not opposing the EEC which was 
considered a the second-best solution. 
 